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Abstract
Poverty is often characterized not only by low and unstable income, but also by
heavy debt burdens. We nd that reducing barriers to saving through access to free
savings accounts decreases participants' short-term debt by about 20%. In addition,
participants who experience an economic shock have less need to reduce consump-
tion, and subjective well-being improves signicantly. Precautionary savings and
credit therefore act as substitutes in providing self-insurance, and participants pre-
fer borrowing less when a free formal savings account is available. Take-up patterns
suggest that requests by others for participants to share their resources may be a
key obstacle to saving.
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The lives of the poor are marked not only by low income, but also by frequent uctua-
tions and costly debt (Collins et al., 2009; Deaton, 1997; Barr, 2012; Banerjee and Duo,
2007). The question of whether using debt is their preferred mechanism to deal with
economic shocks arises. As many poverty-alleviation policies have focused on reducing
credit constraints, concerns have increasingly been voiced about potential overborrow-
ing by the poor (e.g. Roodman, 2012; Angelucci et al., 2013; Fafchamps, 2013; Schicks,
2013). We nd that an oft-neglected aspect of nancial exclusion, access to a formal
savings account, can lead to reduced reliance on short-term debt and signicant welfare
improvements. Traditionally, the literature on consumption smoothing has focused on
the opposite mechanism, in which credit constraints increase the precautionary savings
motive (Deaton, 1991; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Besley, 1995). The possibility to
save in the form of a riskless bond or savings account is usually taken as given (e.g., Zame,
1993), since in contrast to borrowing from others, individuals do not need anyone elses
money to save. An emerging literature shows, however, that individuals may not only be
credit constrained, but also savings constrained, due to lack of access to formal savings
accounts and problems of safety, self-control, and demands from others that limit the
ability to save at home (e.g., Burgess and Pande, 2005; Ashraf et al., 2006b; Brune et al.,
2011; Dupas and Robinson, 2013a,b). This issue is not limited to developing countries.
Even in the United States, 8.2% of all households are unbanked (FDIC, 2011) and several
government policies have aimed to improve access to bank accounts (Washington, 2006).
In a randomized eld experiment among over 3,500 low-income members of a micro-
nance institution in Chile, we nd that barriers to saving are binding enough to aect
participants' borrowing behavior and welfare. Reducing barriers to savings through free
and easy access to a formal savings account decreases participants' dependence on short-
term debt. The propensity to have loans with informal networks of friends and family,
providers of basic services and utilities, business partners and money lenders is reduced.
The total amount of outstanding short-term debt is reduced by about 20%, mainly driven
by the reduction in the outstanding debt to family and friends. Reducing the barriers to
saving not only leads to a replacement of short-term debt by savings, but also improves
overall consumption smoothing. Participants with access to a savings account have less
need to reduce consumption when they experience an economic shock to their income.1
1The loans that the participants received from the micronance institution were on a rigid schedule and
2The consumption cutbacks associated with a negative income shock are reduced by 44%.
The improvements correspond to the types of expenditures for which participants had
expressed desire to build a buer stock, and their magnitudes are in line with the 66,900
Chilean pesos (about 135 USD) in average deposits made by those who took up the ac-
count. These ndings suggest that savings and credit are used as substitute inputs for
consumption smoothing. As the cost of savings is reduced, demand for short-term credit
decreases and overall consumption smoothing increases. In contrast, we nd no eect on
long-term debt such as mortgages or micronance loans.
Participants experience substantial improvements in subjective well-being, both back-
ward looking { they evaluate recent economic diculties as less severe { and forward
looking { they experience less anxiety about their nancial future. The magnitudes of
these improvements are large and correspond to more than half of the change in these
well-being measures associated with a job loss or severe business downturn. This suggests
that the original savings constraints alleviated by the intervention were substantial and
costly for participants' well-being. Two specically designed survey questions help us rule
out that these subjective measures are driven by demand eects.
A formal savings account located away from the home potentially reduces both self-
control and \other-control problems."2 For half of the treatment group, self-control prob-
lems were additionally reduced through a commitment device based on self-help peer
groups. In a separate study, we analyze this treatment, in which participants had the
option to make a weekly deposit commitment and be held accountable by their peers (see
Kast et al., 2013). Those who received this additional peer group support have signif-
icantly higher savings. This raises the question whether our ndings are mainly driven
by this subgroup. For most outcomes, this is not the case. Despite limited statistical
power when analyzing dierential impacts between the two sub-treatments, the reduction
in the propensity to borrow and the improved consumption smoothing for those with an
income shock remain signicant also among those who only received the basic savings
account. The one outcome for which there is a signicantly stronger eect for those with
the additional peer group support is the forward-looking measure of anxiety about the
nancial future, consistent with the larger buer stock accumulated by these participants.
could therefore not be used for unexpected shocks. In focus groups prior to the intervention, participants
expressed strong desire to increase precautionary savings for such occasions.
2\Other-control" problems can result when individuals feel pressured to share their resources with
members of the family and the community (e.g., Hertzberg, 2010; Brune et al., 2011).
3The take-up patterns of who opens and uses the account are also informative about
what the obstacles to savings might have been prior to the intervention. They suggest that
other-control problems are a signicant constraint. Take-up of the account is particularly
high among participants who are not the head of their household, who have conicts with
their partner over money, and (in line with Dupas and Robinson, 2013b) those who are
\socially taxed" through their social network, i.e. those who are lending to others and
are not borrowing from their network themselves. In line with this, those who regretted
not having saved more before the intervention reduce their lending to others as a result
of having access to the savings account. Consistent with Ashraf et al. (2006b), take-up
is also substantially higher for those with hyperbolic time preferences, which may lead to
both increased self and other-control problems.
This paper makes contributions to the literature on savings in several ways. First, our
ndings provide what is, to our knowledge, the rst micro-empirical evidence that reducing
barriers to savings reduces the reliance on debt. As mentioned above, the literature on
precautionary savings has long acknowledged that saving and borrowing are two substitute
mechanisms to help individuals smooth consumption in the face of shocks. In principle,
credit is simply a form of negative savings. Typically, it has been assumed that the
constraint in this substitutive relationship lies on the credit side, and that if individuals
are credit constrained, they have more of a need to build a buer stock for self-insurance.3
On the other hand, even if individuals have the ability to borrow, they might prefer
to save, depending on their level of risk aversion and the cost of savings.4 We test
whether the limited accessibility of formal savings accounts leads to savings constraints
that are binding enough to push participants to borrow more than they otherwise would
and to aect participants' economic well-being. As in many low-income contexts (e.g.,
Townsend, 1994; La Ferrara, 2003; Lusardi et al., 2011; Kinnan and Townsend, 2012;
Mazzocco and Saini, 2012), participants in our population often resort to informal credit
from their network of family and friends and other sources of short-term debt to help
smooth consumption.5 When participants gain access to the free savings accounts they
3The use of buer stocks for self-insurance has been shown empirically by, e.g., Paxson (1992), Udry
(1995) and Alderman (1996), who show how people use savings in response to income shocks. For an
overview on savings motives and precautionary savings see Browning and Lusardi (1996).
4In addition to the forgone consumption, the costs of saving also include costly features of formal
savings accounts, as well as costs associated with saving at home, including fear of theft, self-control
problems to refrain from spending cash on hand, or other-control problems to resist demands from others
to share these resources with them.
5A number of studies have analyzed the degree to which individuals are able to smooth shocks through
these methods and nd that even though social networks can play an important role, they often do not
4not only substitute towards precautionary savings, but also choose to increase overall
levels of smoothing. Even though building a buer stock requires reducing consumption
in the short-run, participants prefer this form of smoothing to the measures that they
were using beforehand, suggesting that these measures were relatively costly.
Second, our ndings contribute to a rapidly growing literature showing benets of
facilitating savings on a variety of outcomes such as poverty reduction (Burgess and
Pande, 2005), investment and income (Brune et al., 2011; Dupas and Robinson, 2013a;
Prina, 2013), and female intra-household bargaining power (Ashraf et al., 2010). This
paper provides what is, to our knowledge, the rst direct evidence showing that access to
a fully liquid savings account can help individuals improve consumption smoothing in the
face of economic shocks. This growing body of research showing positive eects of savings
indicates that mechanisms aimed at helping individuals increase their savings (such as
studied by Ashraf et al., 2006a,b; Brune et al., 2011; Schaner, 2011; Kast et al., 2013;
Atkinson et al., 2013; Dupas and Robinson, 2013b) can be very benecial. At the same
time, several of the commitment devices that have been found to help individuals in
developing countries increase their savings are withdrawal commitment devices which
limit the liquidity of the accounts. In order for the savings to serve a precautionary
purpose, liquidity is important. As discussed in more detail in the conclusion, our results
suggest that a trade-o may exist between the benets of withdrawal commitment devices
and the ability to use savings for consumption smoothing.
Third, our ndings add to the literature on the relationship between poverty and
subjective well-being measures. They suggest that in addition to the importance of levels
of income and poverty for subjective well-being, their variance and the risk to which peo-
ple are exposed may play an important role. The poor often experience great worry and
anxiety about their economic future (e.g., Collins et al., 2009; Haushofer et al., 2012), and
a growing literature studies the impact of interventions aimed at reducing poverty and
its consequences on psychological and subjective well-being (e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2009;
Devoto et al., 2012; Ludwig et al., 2012). While such worry is an important issue to ad-
dress in itself, it can also have negative feedback eects on economic decision-making, and
potentially lead to a poverty trap (Shah et al., 2012). At low levels of income, mechanisms
to smooth consumption are particularly important since economic shocks can have devas-
provide full insurance (e.g., Townsend, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Ligon et al., 2002; Kinnan and Townsend,
2012). Jack and Suri (2014) nd that the introduction of mobile money through cellphones can strongly
increase the degree of such insurance by facilitating redistribution across geographic locations where
shocks are less correlated.
5tating eects and lead resources to fall below what is required to cover basic needs (e.g.,
Townsend, 1994; Morduch, 1995). At the same time, the poor are often faced with highly
variable income streams and expenditure shocks (e.g., Townsend, 1995; Deaton, 1997;
Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Banerjee and Duo, 2007; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009)
and have limited formal insurance (e.g., Jacoby and Skouas, 1997; Banerjee and Duo,
2007; Gin e and Yang, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Gin e et al., 2012; Cole et al., 2013b). Being
dependent on the social network for insurance can also be psychologically or practically
costly (Dezs} o and Loewenstein, 2012; Jakiela and Ozier, 2012). All of these factors may
contribute to our nding of large improvements in participants' assessment of their re-
cent economic diculties and their anxiety about their nancial future. More research
is required to study the relative importance of levels of income and poverty, versus their
variance, in aecting psychological health and subjective well-being.
Finally, this paper provides evidence for a growing body of research showing that the
ability to save interacts with the relationships individuals have in their social network.
This interaction can play out in two directions with the social network can aecting
savings, and vice versa. In the rst direction, peers and the social environment can make
it either harder for individuals to save (due, for example, to pressure to share resources,
as in Baland et al., 2011; Brune et al., 2011; Schaner, 2013) or easier (for example as a
commitment device, as in Kast et al., 2013). At the same time, access to savings can
in turn aect participants' nancial relationship to others in their social network (Flory,
2012; Comola and Prina, 2013). We nd evidence for both directions. Participants who
are subject to more other-control problems are more likely to take up the account, and
access to the account in turn reduces lending to others among those who initially regretted
not having saved more. When thinking about dierent savings policies, it is therefore
important to also consider their possible interactions with the social environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides information
about the background, data and study design, Section 3 discusses results, robustness
checks, and determinants of take-up and Section 4 concludes.
62 Background, Data and Study Design
2.1 Background and Data
The study was conducted in collaboration with Fondo Esperanza (FE), a Chilean micro-
nance institution, and Banco Credichile (BC), a large commercial bank. The savings
accounts that were oered to FE's members as part of the intervention were held with
Banco Credichile because FE is not legally licensed to hold savings deposits. FE's mem-
bers are self-employed micro-entrepreneurs (e.g., street vendors or cosmetics saleswomen),
many of whom work in the informal sector. About 91% are women, and most live and
work in urban areas. FE provides micro-loans to its members in three-month cycles,
repayment of which is monitored in weekly or biweekly group meetings.
FE's credit disbursement and repayment is on a very rigid schedule, and consequently
cannot be used as insurance for emergencies or for unexpected income or expenditure
shocks, similar to other micro-credit arrangements (Karlan and Mullainathan, 2010).6
Given the rigidity in the timing of the loans, it is not surprising that in focus groups
conducted prior to the intervention, many members expressed the desire to increase their
liquid savings to build a buer stock for unexpected shocks and emergencies.7 Participants
emphasized several constraints to their current ability to save. First, monetary costs were
a major constraint and participants mentioned the need for cost-free accounts. Due to the
fee structure of the accounts that were generally available at that time, accounts with small
balances often faced potentially large negative returns. The concern with the xed costs
of formal savings is in line with ndings by Cole et al. (2011) in Indonesia and Dupas et al.
(2012) in Western Kenya. In addition to the nancial costs, mental transaction costs also
seemed to contribute to the savings constraints. Many expressed concerns about feeling
intimidated to go into a bank or not knowing what would be required to be eligible to
open an account.
This population is of particular interest to study since it has sometimes been ques-
tioned whether microcredit makes participants borrow too much, and whether it might
be in their interest to build up savings instead, in order to reduce the need for credit
(e.g., Ananth et al., 2007). It is therefore of interest to study whether increasing access
6Field et al. (2012) show that relaxing this rigidity, and in particular, delaying the time when the loan
repayment starts, can increase business investment and prots.
7None of the participants of the focus groups were subsequently included in the randomized study, to
avoid any possible contamination of the study by the pre-treatment discussions.
7to a formal savings vehicle reduces borrowing. If participants continue borrowing, large
amounts of savings would be suboptimal, as they continue paying expensive interest rates
that they could reduce by paying down the debt. However, some amount of precautionary
savings is valuable at any level of debt because of the dierence in liquidity of savings
and loans (Zinman, 2007). If the debt cannot be taken out exibly, then having a small
savings cushion for emergencies can make an important dierence in reducing the pres-
sure of economic uctuations. This is particularly the case for a population such as the
participants in this study, who work predominantly in the informal sector and experience
frequent income and expenditure shocks.
This study draws on three dierent sources of data. All outcome variables, as well
as most personal characteristics, were obtained through extensive baseline and follow-
up surveys. The baseline survey was conducted prior to the introduction of the savings
accounts in April-May 2008 during one of the group meetings. The follow-up survey
was administered in June-July 2009 at the participants' home or work place so that
those who had left FE in the meantime could still be reached. The surveys include
detailed questions about participants' savings and debt, their economic situation, recent
consumption patterns, as well as subjective measures such as participants' anxiety about
their nancial future, assessment of their recent economic diculties, regret about not
having saved more, and time preferences.
The questionnaires were administered by the independent survey agency, Centro de
Microdatos at the University of Chile. While participants were aware that the survey was
related to their membership with FE, they had no way of knowing that it was related
to the savings accounts oered by BC. As discussed below in Section 3.3, the survey
also included two questions specically designed to test for demand eects to rule out
the possibility that receiving access to a savings account through FE aects participants'
propensity to respond to survey questions in a favorable or socially expected way.
We complement this survey data with two sources of administrative records. Infor-
mation on savings in the study accounts was obtained directly from BC. Finally, we used
FE's administrative les to obtain information on each participant's estimated household
size, household income, and years of education.
82.2 Balance of Randomization and Baseline Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents baseline summary statistics. Columns (1) and (2) show that in the overall
sample, characteristics in the treatment group are not statistically signicantly dierent
from the control group. Participants are on average 43 years old and have 10 years of
schooling. The average household size is 4.3 and the mean monthly income per capita
in the household is 80 thousand Chilean pesos (about 160 USD), with a median of 66
thousand.8 Sixty eight percent of participants did not have a savings account prior to
the study. Correspondingly, the median amount of pre-existing formal savings in a bank
or a cooperative is zero, with a mean of 63 thousand pesos. While income is reported in
per capita terms, these gures may represent the savings of several household members
combined, especially those of participants' children.
[Table 1]
Participants' short-term borrowing and lending behavior is captured by two types
of measures. The rst is the amount of short-term lending and borrowing. The second
measure is less noisy and captures the extensive margin of categories of people and institu-
tions that participants have borrowed from or lent to, such as parents, neighbors, business
partners etc. Table 1 shows that participants had an average of 166 thousand pesos in
outstanding short-term debt (66 thousand when winsorized at the 95th percentile) and
owed money to an average of 0.91 of the 15 possible categories of short-term creditors.
The average amount of lending was 110 thousand pesos (69 thousand when winsorized at
the 95th percentile) and this was lent to an average of 1.07 of 9 possible categories.
To measure consumption smoothing, we develop a new approach. Rather than elic-
iting detailed consumption data, which is complex to capture and often provides quite
noisy measures, we asked participants directly whether they had to cut back consumption
on a series of specic items due to economic diculties in the preceding three months.9
This approach follows the same logic as De Mel et al. (2009), who nd that small business
owners are capable of reporting their overall prots directly with just as much or better
accuracy than surveys that elicit detailed cost and revenue data. In our sample, 70% of
participants reported having had to reduce at least one of the consumption items. We
8500 Chilean pesos = approximately 1 USD.
9The consumption items include meals, meat, medicine, school supplies, clothing, school snacks, walk-
ing instead of using public transportation, and eating out. These items resulted from the cutbacks
mentioned by other FE members in focus groups conducted prior to the intervention.
9validate this new measure by testing whether it correlates in the predicted way with par-
ticipants' personal economic situation. Indeed, we nd that those who experienced a job
loss in the household or a signicant downturn of their business in the preceding three
months reported cutting back consumption in 53% more categories than those who did
not.
While this measure captures only the variance of consumption, rather than the level,
it has several advantages compared to alternative approaches that measure overall con-
sumption and then back out consumption cutbacks from there. It does not require par-
ticipants to recall the specic amounts consumed, which can be quite unreliable (Ahmed
et al., 2006), nor to ll out detailed consumption diaries. This allows the survey to be
shorter, thereby increasing the quality of response on other sections of the survey, as
participants are less fatigued (see e.g. Herzog and Bachman, 1981; Galesic and Bosnjak,
2009). At the same time, it also avoids any potential direct eects of keeping a consump-
tion diary on the behavior or perception of participants (for examples of such eects see
e.g. Deaton, 1997 and Zwane et al., 2011).
With respect to measures of self-reported well-being, the survey includes one forward-
looking and one backward-looking question. The forward-looking question asked partic-
ipants if they were anxious about their nancial future. The mean response was 2.9
on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 means strongly agree and 4 means strongly disagree. The
backward-looking measure was asked after the specic questions about participants' recent
economic shocks, consumption etc. in order to allow participants to recall and evaluate
their recent economic situation more accurately. The question on recent economic di-
culties asks, \In sum, thinking about all the economic diculties of the last three months,
on a scale of one to ten, how dicult was this situation for you?" The mean answer was
5.1 on a range of 1 to 10.
In the follow-up survey, conducted one year after the introduction of the accounts, 592
(14.2 percent) of the original 4,175 participants from the baseline could not be found by
the survey agency. For these participants, no outcome variables are available, and they
could therefore not be included in the impact evaluation. All nal outcomes reported
in this paper therefore exclude these 592 individuals. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1
show the baseline summary statistics for this sample. Similar to the full sample, none of
the characteristics are signicantly dierent between the treatment and control groups.
Section 3.3 discusses the attrition in more detail and provides robustness checks to address
it.
102.3 Implementation and Empirical Specication
Prior to any intervention, the baseline survey was conducted among 307 groups of Fondo
Esperanza's (FE's) members. The universe of study participants consists of all members
who were present in the meeting when the baseline survey was administered. Two-thirds
of the groups were randomly selected to be oered a free savings account while the control
group was not eligible for this type of savings account. The randomization was conducted
at the group level. All members of each group received the same treatment, such that
participants in the control group were not aected indirectly by the treatment through
spillover eects within the FE group.
The opportunity to open a savings account was introduced during group meetings in
the weeks following the baseline survey. The accounts were set up in a way to minimize
both nancial and mental transaction costs. In contrast to other savings accounts available
in the market at the time, the study accounts had no maintenance fees and no minimum
balance. The minimum opening deposit was only 1,000 Chilean pesos (about 2 USD).
Take-up of the account was completely voluntary. In order to overcome the frequently
expressed sentiment of feeling intimidated to enter a bank, interested participants were
oered an opportunity to go to the bank together with their peers to open an account and
were informed precisely which documents were required to open the account.10 Savings
in the accounts were fully liquid for withdrawal at the bank's branches at any time.
The standard accounts had a standard real interest rate of 0.3%. A subgroup of one
quarter of treated groups was randomly assigned to receive a preferential interest rate
of 5%, and in half of the treated groups, self-control problems were additionally reduced
through a peer group commitment mechanism. These conditions were guaranteed for a
minimum of two years. Kast et al. (2013) study the dierential savings behavior resulting
from these dierent sub-treatments.11 The 5% interest rate did not aect savings for
the vast majority of participants, while the peer group commitment device signicantly
increased the number of deposits and almost doubled the average balance in the accounts.
Section 3.3 therefore analyzes whether there are dierential eects for those who had
additional support through the peer group deposit commitment device. The main analysis
10In the baseline survey, 46% the of participants reported that they did not like entering a bank because
they felt intimidated.
11Another intervention studied in Kast et al. (2013), in which feedback messages were sent to partici-
pants, was launched only after the follow-up survey and does therefore not aect the results presented in
this paper.
11of the paper focuses on the overall impact of reducing barriers to saving through access
to any of the savings accounts.
To analyze the eect of having a savings account on various outcomes of interest, we
estimate a simple dierence-in-dierence specication, comparing those in the treatment
group to those in the control group at the time of the baseline and follow-up survey:
Yit =  + AccountAccessit + i + t + it; (1)
where Yit is the outcome variable of interest, AccountAccessit is a dummy variable that
takes on the value one if individual i is in the treatment group and period t is the treatment
period. Individual xed eects are represented by i, time xed eects by t, and it is
the error term. All standard errors are clustered at the group level.
This analysis provides the Intent-to-Treat (ITT) eects of the intervention. We do
not calculate the Treatment-on-the-Treated (TOT) eects, since opening an account can
have potential spillover eects on other members of the group who do not take up the
account. The ITT specication incorporates such potential spillover eects. Assuming
spillovers are zero and given that the take-up rate is 39%, the TOT eect would be a
little under triple the size of the ITT eect.
To capture participants' short-term borrowing and lending behavior, we asked them
a series of detailed survey questions on whether they had lent to or borrowed from a
particular category of person or institution (such as a parent, neighbor, supplier, etc.)
and if so how much. These categories fall into one of ve forms of debt or lending: (1)
informal borrowing from family and friends, (2) outstanding payments to service providers
and utilities, (3) debt to business contacts and short-term lending institutions, (4) lending
to family and friends, and (5) lending to business contacts.12 As outcome variables we
use both the amounts of debt or credit and the number of categories of debt or credit
that participants had.
Many topics in our analysis are addressed by a series of related questions (e.g. cut-
12The categories in each of these ve forms are as follows. (1) & (4) Borrowing from and lending to
friends and family: parents, children, siblings, partner, friends, and other relatives. (2) Debt to service
providers: medical facilities, educational institutions, and utilities (water, gas, electricity, phone). (3)
Debt to business contacts and short-term lending institutions: suppliers, business partners, stores, non-
bank lending institutions (so called nancieras and cooperativas), and money lenders. The variable does
not include long-term nancial debt, such as mortgages, formal bank loans, promissory notes and loans
with FE, which cannot be used for quick emergency borrowing. (5) Finally, lending to business contacts:
clients, business partners, and FE partners.
12back of a number of consumption items, forward-looking and backward-looking subjective
wellbeing, etc.). To assess the overall statistical signicance of such related outcome vari-
ables, we also report the average eect size (AES), using the methodology in Kling et al.
(2004) and Clingingsmith et al. (2009). The AES of each grouping of outcome variables
serves as an index of the underlying individual treatment eects. It is calculated using
the average of the normalized treatment eects from each of the underlying regressions.13
Looking at the overall AES reduces the risk of falsely accepting individual treatment
eects that are signicant only by chance.
3 Results
3.1 Impact of Access to a Savings Account
Account Usage
Take-up of the account was voluntary. 53% of eligible participants opened an account
and 39% actively used it. An active user is dened as someone who deposited more than
the 1,000 pesos minimum opening amount. Following Dupas et al. (2012), we use active
use as our take-up measure. Section 3.2 discusses determinants of take-up and what they
suggest about underlying barriers to saving. For those who actively used the account,
the mean number of deposits over the course of a year was 4.4 and the median was 2.
They deposited an average of 66,900 pesos in total (about 135 USD) with a median of
9,000 pesos. The average number of withdrawals was 1.0 and the total amount withdrawn
was 46,700 (about 95 USD) on average. Over the year of the study, participants held an
average monthly savings balance of around 18,500 Chilean pesos (about 37 USD). This
balance amount represents about 23% of monthly income and corresponds in size to the
type of expenditures for which participants had expressed wanting to build a buer, such
as unexpected doctor's visits and payments for heating, electricity or food during periods
of short-term income uctuation.
[Table 2]
Borrowing
13Since the AES cannot deal with large numbers of xed eects, we include a treatment dummy in the
AES regressions in place of the individual xed eects.
13We rst analyze the impact of access to a savings account on the use of short-term
credit. If savings were to have a precautionary purpose, as participants had stated in the
focus groups, having more savings could reduce the need for short-term debt to cope with
economic uctuations.
[Table 3]
Panel A in Table 3 shows that indeed, the amount of outstanding short-term debt
declines by 12,931 pesos for those with access to the account, signicant at the 5% level.14
This represents a reduction of 20% compared to the post-intervention mean in the control
group. Looking at what type of short-term debt is reduced, we see the strongest reduction
on the amount owed to family and friends with 6,500 peso, signicant at the 1% level.
This represents a 38% reduction compared to the post-intervention control group mean.
Within family and friends, the reduction is strongest for parents, signicant at the 1%
level, who are the most frequent category participants borrowed from within family and
friends.
Next, we look at an alternative, less noisy measure: the discrete number of categories
of people or institutions with which participants reported having any debt, such as parents,
siblings, neighbors, or suppliers. Panel B shows a reduction of 0.127 categories, signicant
at the 5% level, for those with access to the account. This represents a decrease of 22%
compared to the control group mean in the post-treatment period.
Looking at the three types of borrowing we see that the largest decrease again stems
from informal borrowing from family and friends, which is reduced by 0.072, signicant
at the 5% level. This is a 36% decrease compared to the control group mean in the
post-treatment period. Among the specic categories, borrowing from parents was again
reduced the most, signicant at the 1% level. With this discrete measure of borrowing, the
outstanding payments to service providers also decline signicantly, by 0.057 categories,
signicant at the 5% level, representing a reduction of 24% compared to the control group
mean in the post-treatment period. Within the components of outstanding payments, the
reduction in debt with utility providers (electric, gas, water, and telephone) is the largest
with 37%, signicant at the 5% level. Outstanding payments to utility providers can have
particularly negative eects, as they can lead to participants' families being left without
heating or electricity until payment is restored.
14These results are winsorized at the 95th percentile due to large outliers. See Appendix Table A1 for
unwinsorized amounts.
14There is again no signicant eect on the overall debt to business contacts and non-
bank lending institutions. Among the components of this form of borrowing, the prob-
abilities of borrowing from money lenders and from business partners were signicantly
reduced at the 5% level. However, since both of these types of borrowing are not frequent,
they do not signicantly aect the overall number of categories.
To conrm that the decrease in borrowing is indeed concentrated on short-term debt
that serves to smooth economic shocks or emergencies, we also look at long-term borrowing
in the form of mortgages, loans with FE, formal bank loans, etc. Consistent with the role
of savings as a substitute for borrowing for self-insurance, we nd no impact on long-term
borrowing amounts or categories.
Since credit is expensive, one could imagine that participants use their savings ac-
count to build savings not only towards a buer stock for self-insurance but also to reduce
their next installment of micro-credit for their business investments, or to pay down long-
term debt. The fact that we do not nd evidence for this suggests that building a buer
stock might be more urgent for this population than reducing debt. It is also consistent
with the notion that participants do not want to discontinue their micro-credit since par-
ticipating with FE provides them with other benets. Whether or not it is benecial for
this population to use micro-credit is a separate question that is beyond the scope of this
paper. It is nevertheless interesting to note that participants seem to reduce borrowing
from family and friends before reducing borrowing from the MFI.
Lending
Having established the reduction in short-term borrowing, we look at the other di-
mension of debt, i.e. being a creditor. Having a savings account could lead participants
to become less generous in providing loans to their social network, since they now depend
less on loans from their network for insurance purposes. In addition, savings accounts
may allow individuals to shield their savings from requests of others to share. On the
other hand, having a buer stock may allow individuals to help their social network with
a loan in times of need. The evidence on this issue is quite mixed. Chandrasekhar et al.
(2012) nd no negative impact of access to savings on interpersonal transfers in a lab
experiment in India. Flory (2012) nds in Malawi that having a savings account increases
participants' cash gifts to others.
[Table 4]
15Table 4 displays the impact on lending to others. For the full sample (Columns 1-3),
there are no statistically signicant eects on amounts lent or categories of borrowers
lent to. However, for the 68% who indicated in the baseline survey that they always or
frequently regret not having saved more (Columns 4-6), there is a signicant reduction
in lending both in amounts (12 thousand pesos) and in categories of borrowers (0.61
categories).15 For both amounts and categories, the eect is largest on lending to family
and friends, signicant at the 1% level. In addition, the reduction for business contacts
is also marginally signicant.
This nding is consistent with the notion of other-control problems, i.e. the requests
for money by others may have presented an obstacle to building their own savings for this
group, which led them to regret not having saved more. Once they have a place to store
their savings away from home, they are able to reduce their loans to others and build
their own buer stock of savings. As we will see in Section 3.2 below, this interpretation
is also consistent with the take-up pattern. However, since we did not start the analysis
with a hypothesis for the subgroup that regretted not having saved more in mind, further
research is required to investigate whether this dierential eect is robust to replication.
Consumption Smoothing
The preceding results showed that participants substitute credit with savings and
signicantly reduce their use of short-term borrowing when given access to a savings
account. If savings and credit are substitute mechanisms for consumption smoothing, the
question arises of whether relaxing the savings constraint mainly leads to a replacement of
credit by savings, or whether overall smoothing is increased in addition. It is conceivable
that participants' main response to access to the savings accounts is to substitute to a
dierent means of smoothing, while maintaining their overall level of smoothing. This
section analyzes how the intervention aects participants' ability to smooth consumption
during times of economic shocks to their income.
As discussed in Section 2.2 above, our measure of consumption smoothing asks par-
ticipants directly, whether they had to cut back various forms of consumption due to hard
times in the preceding three months. Overall in this population, the need to reduce con-
sumption due to economic diculty is quite frequent. In the baseline, 70% of participants
reported having to cut back on at least one of the consumption items in the pre-treatment
15The amounts are again winsorized at the 95th percentile due to large outliers. See Appendix Table A2
for the non-winsorized amounts.
16period. For the individual items, this frequency ranges from 8% to 51%, with the largest
proportion of participants reducing clothing, eating out and meat consumption. To estab-
lish which participants were aected by a shock to their income, we asked whether they
had experienced a job loss in the household or a signicant business downturn. Forty
percent of participants experienced at least one such shock in the three months preceding
the follow-up survey. Table 5 shows how their need to reduce consumption due to hard
times was aected by the treatment.
[Table 5]
First, the coecients on the post-treatment dummy indicate that indeed, those who
experienced a recent shock had to increase the extent to which they had to cut back
consumption on many of the specic items. This increase is oset by more than half for
those who had access to the savings account. The eect is particularly large for meat and
walking instead of using public transportation.16 While the cutback is not statistically
signicant for many of the individual coeecients, the relevant question for the analysis
is whether there has been an overall reduction. Indeed, we nd that the relatively small
buer stock amounts seem to have a signicant impact in helping participants cope with
income uctuations. The overall AES for reduction in consumption cutbacks of -0.112 is
signicant at the 5% level.17
Quantitatively, these eects are substantial. Using a triple dierence specication, we
nd that for participants who were oered an account, the overall increase in consumption
cutbacks associated with an income shock (measured as the number of items for which
consumption had to be reduced) was mitigated by 44%. In the treatment group, a negative
income shock in the post-treatment period was associated with a 0.49 increase in cutbacks,
compared to a 0.88 increase in the control group (p-value of the dierence = 0.059).18
These ndings show that access to the savings accounts helped participants better smooth
their consumption following an income shock.
16Specically, in the urban Chilean context, the poor's workplace is often far away from their home,
with business activities located in the city center and housing for the poor at the outskirts. Cutting
back on public transportation in these cases therefore often means a walk of two or more hours in each
direction.
17Table A3 in the Appendix shows consumption cutbacks for the full population, including those who
did not experience a shock. Again, the frequency of reducing consumption is reduced for almost all items,
however, the overall impact is no longer statistically signicant (AES p-value = 0.23).
18These estimates result from a triple dierence-in-dierence regression that compares the impact of
an income shock in the post-treatment period on participants' consumption cutbacks between those who
were and were not oered an account, controlling for time period and individual xed eects.
17Subjective Well-Being
Both the reduced indebtedness and the improved consumption smoothing capability
can potentially contribute to alleviating participants' perceived economic well-being and
anxiety about their nancial future. Beyond the physical challenges of limited consump-
tion, worry and anxiety about one's economic situation is one of the dicult characteristics
that mark the lives of many of the poor. Qualitative and correlational evidence suggests
that debt can be a particular source of such mental distress (e.g. Taylor et al., 2006;
Kuruvilla and Jacob, 2007).
We assess whether participants experienced a subjective insurance eect from access
to the savings account through one forward- and one backward-looking measure: partici-
pants' anxiety about their nancial future and their overall assessment of recent economic
diculties (see Section 2.2 for a more detailed description of these variables). Table 6
shows the impact on both of these outcomes. Since the units of measurement for anxiety
and economic diculty are not quantitatively meaningful, we normalize them to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one among the control group. This way, the
eects are expressed in terms of standard deviations. One year after receiving a savings
account, participants in the treatment group are 0.112 standard deviations less anxious
about their nancial future than those in the control group and experience their overall
recent economic situation as 0.087 standard deviations less dicult. The overall AES on
subjective well-being is -0.102 and signicant at the 5% level.
[Table 6]
To facilitate the interpretation of the magnitude of these treatment eects, we com-
pare them to changes in these measures associated with other economic events, such as
a job loss in the household and a signicant business downturn.19 This benchmark com-
parison reveals that the eects are substantial. The magnitude of the backward-looking
eect of access to the account on perceived recent economic diculties is 78% as large as
the change of this measure associated with a job loss in the household and 54% as large as
the change associated with a business downturn. The forward-looking eect of access to
the savings account on participants' anxiety about their nancial future is 117% as large
19To measure this association, we compare the coecients in Table 6 to the change associated with
having experienced an economic shock in the preceding three months, as captured by a dierence-in-
dierence regression of job loss or business downturn in the preceding three months on the two subjective
well-being measures respectively.
18as the change in anxiety associated with a job loss, and 57% as large as the change as-
sociated with a business downturn. In sum, as a rough benchmark comparison, receiving
access to the savings account improves subjective well-being by more than half as much
as not losing a job or experiencing a business downturn { a quite sizeable amount.
We can further examine the improvements on the self-reported well-being measures
through generalized ordered probit estimation. This allows us to see where in the distri-
bution the improvements are coming from. Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix show the
results for anxiety and perceived recent economic diculties, respectively. In Table A4,
Column (3) shows that the improvement in anxiety is particularly strong at the top of
the distribution, making participants signicantly less likely to stay in the most anxious
category. With respect to the rating of recent economic diculties (Table A5), the impact
seems to be strongest in the middle of the distribution. For both subjective well-being
measures, the coecients point towards improvement throughout the whole range of the
distribution.
Overall, the analysis of the impact on subjective well-being reveals sizeable improve-
ments in both participants' assessments of their recent economic situation, and in their
outlook of the future.
Other Outcomes
There are two groups of outcome variables that we tested, but for which we do not
nd statistically signicant eects { household dynamics and spending on bulky pur-
chases. Money is often a major source of conict among couples, and in other contexts,
savings outside of the house have been found to play an important role as a strategy
for women to hide money from their husbands (Anderson and Baland (2002), looking at
ROSCAs in Kenya) or as a means for women to improve bargaining power and control over
their spending decisions (Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2010) in the Philippines; Dupas and
Robinson (2013a) in Kenya). Our results, however, nd no signicant eect on household
dynamics.20 One reason why access to a savings account does not lead to a change in the
intra-household dynamics in our study might be that in Chile, women are traditionally
in charge of household nances and savings decisions, so the introduction of the savings
accounts may not have a signicant impact on these power dynamics.
20The questions in this module were: Who in the household makes decisions about spending? Who in
the household makes decisions about savings? Do you hide savings from your partner or other relatives?
Did you recently ask your partner for money? Do you have conicts with your partner about money?
19We also nd no eects on bulky expenditures. The sub-questions in this category
ask whether in the previous three months, participants made purchases in any of the
following categories: (1) a television, radio, or computer; (2) machinery or equipment for
their business; (3) making signicant improvements in their home (painting, oor, roof,
etc.); (4) paying down their debt to FE in advance. While the lack of eect on these
bulky items might simply mean that the survey did not include the relevant items, it
is consistent with the interpretation that participants mainly used their liquid savings
accounts to build a buer stock for insurance, and reserved their chunky credit with FE
for bulky expenditures and investments.
3.2 Take-up
The take-up patterns for the accounts provide interesting insights into the drivers of de-
mand for the formal savings accounts, and suggestive results as to what the underlying
savings constraints without an account may be. In Table 7, Panel A shows demographic
determinants of take-up and Panel B analyzes other personal characteristics that may
aect savings decisions, controlling for the demographics in Panel A. The personal char-
acteristics that are predictive of take-up are consistent with a situation where participants
use the account in order to reduce both their self-control and other-control problems.
[Table 7]
Household dynamics that are indicative of other-control problems are predictive of
take-up. Being head of the household { an indicator of having more control over intra-
household resource allocation { is negatively correlated with take-up. For heads of house-
hold, take-up is 4 percentage points lower, a reduction of 10 percent compared to the over-
all take-up rate, and is signicant at the 10% level (controlling for demographic variables
and other personal characteristics). Participants who are not the head of the households
may be the most interested in reducing the exposure of their savings to the demands by
others in the household. Relatedly, having conicts with one's partner over monetary
issues increases take-up by 5 percentage points, an increase of 13 percent. Those with
more conict might feel more of a need to put their resources out of reach of their partner.
Consistent with Dupas and Robinson (2013b), we also nd that individuals who are
\socially taxed" { i.e. those who lend to friends and family but do not receive such
20loans themselves { are signicantly more likely to take up the accounts. Socially taxed
participants are 7 percentage points more likely to open and use the account, an increase
of 17% percent. Separating the two components of being socially taxed in Column (3),
we nd the expected sign on both dimensions. Individuals who lent money to relatives
or friends are 5 percentage points more likely to take up the account, and there is a
statistically insignicant negative correlation of 2 percentage points for those who owe
money to family or friends. The correlations of take-up with both the household dynamics
and with being socially taxed suggest that other-control problems may be an important
driver of the demand for formal savings accounts.
The evidence on the role of self-control problems for take-up is mixed. Our two mea-
sures indicating possible self-control problems { regret about not having saved more, and
hyperbolic time preferences21 { show somewhat dierent results. On the one hand, hyper-
bolic individuals are 5.5 percentage points more likely to take up the savings account.22
On the other hand, participants who indicate regretting not having saved more (and for
which analysis described above nds that they reduce lending to others in response to
receiving access to the account), are not signicantly more likely to open the account.
A third potential motivation for opening an account, in addition to self- and other-
control problems, could be safety concerns. However, we do not nd that fear of hav-
ing one's savings stolen aects take-up in a signicant way. With respect to the socio-
demographic variables in Panel A, younger people and men are less likely to take up the
account. The former is consistent with statements from the focus groups that young peo-
ple are more likely to rely on their parents for a nancial safety cushion and may therefore
not need precautionary savings as much. The latter is consistent with the social norm in
Chile that women tend to be in charge of household savings. Finally, it is interesting to
note the role of income. Lower income is associated with lower take-up. This is consistent
with Karlan and Zinman (2012) and Dupas and Robinson (2013a) who nd a positive
association of wealth and income, respectively, with take-up of a savings account. Access
to an account may therefore not reach the poorest of the poor to the desired extent. This
reinforces the pattern found in many settings that getting buy-in by the lowest income
21Hyperbolic preferences are determined by giving survey participants hypothetical choices between x
pesos in time t and y pesos (x < y) in time t+1 month, similar to e.g., Ashraf et al. (2006b) and Meier
and Sprenger (2010).
22This is consistent with Ashraf et al. (2006b), who nd that individuals with hyperbolic time prefer-
ences demonstrate a preference for commitment devices. Testing for subsequent usage, we nd that being
hyperbolic does not reduce the probability of using the account conditional on opening one, and contrary
to the ndings of Ashraf et al. (2006b), does not lead to a greater variance in the account balance.
21population for socially benecial programs can be challenging.
3.3 Robustness Checks
In the following section, we rst analyze two potential threats to the validity of the
analysis: demand eects and attrition. We then analyze whether the eects are driven by
the sub-treatment, i.e. the additional alleviation of self-control constraints through the
peer group commitment device.
Demand Eects
Demand eects refer to changes in behavior by experimental subjects due to cues
about what constitutes appropriate behavior (e.g., Crowne and Marlowe, 1964; Zizzo,
2010). In the context of this study, one concern is that participants who received access
to a savings account through FE might report more positive answers in the follow-up
survey out of gratitude or a sense of indebtedness towards the organization. This is not
very likely to be the case here, since participants did not know that the survey was related
to the savings account.23 Even so, we included two questions in the survey specically
designed to test for possible demand eects. The goal was to include questions that would
be particularly susceptible to demand eects.
[Table 8]
The rst question (at the very beginning of the survey) asked participants how com-
plicated they found the process of scheduling the interview. The second question was
asked at the very end of the survey, in case participants would nd out during the survey
that it was related to the savings account. This question asked participants how satised
they were with FE. Table 8 shows that neither of these questions respond to the treat-
ment. Participants receiving the treatment rated the diculty of the survey process as
0.04 points higher compared to 2.45 of the control group (on a scale from 1 to 4) and
satisfaction with FE as 0.01 point lower compared to 6.38 of the control group (on a
scale from 1 to 7), with neither eect being close to statistical signicance. This gives us
reassurance that the self-reported ndings in this paper are not driven by demand eects.
23Participants knew that the survey was from FE, but FE has many dierent activities and products
and no specic mention of the savings account was made when presenting the survey.
22Attrition
In order to ensure the inclusion of individuals who were no longer members of FE,
the follow-up survey was administered at the participants' home or business location.
Despite special eorts aimed at limiting attrition,24 14.2% of participants could not be
found for the follow-up survey. Column 2 in Table A6 in the Appendix shows that when
comparing attrition rates across the treatment and control groups, we nd that attrition is
2.8 percentage points higher in the treatment group. Using data from the baseline survey,
we can see that attrition is not fully balanced on characteristics. Participants who are
younger, live in smaller households, have more previous savings, or less short-term lending
in the baseline period are less likely to be found for the follow-up survey. Even though, as
shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1, overall characteristics are still balanced between
the treatment and control groups among the non-attritors, the dierential attrition still
raises some concerns about a potential bias being introduced.
Given the fact that we use individual xed eects, the analysis is controlling for all
time-invariant characteristics. We can therefore rule out any bias resulting from time-
invariant dierences in the composition of treatment and control group. What we cannot
rule out, however, is that the somewhat dierent attrition rates between treatment and
control groups lead to dierential trends over time among the non-attritors.
We address this concern in two ways. First, we use the bounding approach of Lee
(2005) to construct upper and lower bounds for the treatment eect. Lee bounds are
based on trimming the distribution of the outcome variable once from each end of the
distribution by a \trimming proportion." That proportion corresponds to the dierence
in attrition rates between the treatment and control group as a proportion of the retention
rate of the treatment group, which is in our case 3.2%. Table A7 in the Appendix shows
that the coecients do not change their sign within these conservative Lee bounds. The
range of the treatment eects on borrowing is between 3,140 and 13,839 pesos for the
total amount of outstanding short-term debt, and between 0.08 and 0.14 for the number
of categories. With respect to self-reported well-being, the eect ranges from 0.08 to 0.17
standard deviations for anxiety about the nancial future and from 0.06 to 0.12 standard
deviations for recent economic diculty.
24During the baseline survey, we asked participants not only for their own contact information, but also
for the contact details of a close relative or friend through whom they could be reached. In addition, we
chose to work with the survey agency Microdatos, which has special expertise in following participants
for panel studies.
23Second, we recalculate the main results by reweighting our sample to compensate for
the dierential composition between treatment and control groups using inverse proba-
bility weights (Wooldridge, 2002, 2007). This approach rst predicts the probability that
based on observables, a participant will be in the follow-up survey, by using a probit
regression.25 Thereafter, each individual is weighted with the inverse of this probability.
Those who are less likely to be part of the follow-up survey hence receive a higher weight,
leading participants with characteristics that are underrepresented in the follow-up survey
to be counted more heavily.
All results remain qualitatively unchanged when applying inverse probability weights
(see Table A8 in the Appendix). Being in the treatment group reduces the total amount
of outstanding short-term debt by 12,931 pesos without, and by 13,930 pesos with the
attrition weights. The number of categories that participants are indebted to is reduced by
0.13 both with and without attrition weights. On the question of the participant's anxiety
about their nancial future, treatment improved the average response by 0.11 standard
deviations without attrition weights, and by 0.12 standard deviations with the weights.
For recent economic diculty, the improvement is 0.09 standard deviations without and
0.10 with attrition weights. Finally, being in the treatment group reduces the consumption
cutback index for individuals who had a shock by 0.38 units without, and by 0.40 with
attrition weights. Overall, reweighting the analysis to account for the slightly dierent
attrition proportion between treatment and control group does not substantially aect
the magnitudes of any of our main results.
Dierential Eects by Type of Account
As discussed in Section 2.3, for half of the sample, the access to the formal savings ac-
count was accompanied by a peer group savings commitment device.26 This commitment
device was designed to additionally remove barriers to savings by reducing self-control
problems and has been found by Kast et al. (2013) to signicantly increase savings in
the accounts. It is therefore of interest to understand whether the results we nd in
25The following variables are used to construct the weights: all main outcome variables at baseline, all
variables for which there is a signicant dierence between attritors and non-attritors in Table A6, and
a number of additional characteristics which assure that conditional on all weight variables, being in the
treatment group is no longer statistically signicantly associated with attrition (p=0.152).
26In the groups that had been selected for the peer group savings commitment device, participants had
the option of making a pledge as to how much they were going to deposit into the account every week.
In the regular group meetings, participants followed up on each other's commitments and checked who
had a deposit slip to prove that they had made their weekly deposit.
24this paper are mainly driven by the subgroup who received the peer group support, or
whether they are also present for those who simply received access to the formal savings
account. Splitting the sample in half to compare the subgroups with and without peer
group support leads to a loss in statistical power since the number of observations in each
sub-treatment is smaller. This will tend to reduce the level of signicance for individual
coecients, so some of what follows is more of a suggestive nature.
[Table 9]
Table 9 shows the results for those with just the basic account, and the dierence
for those with the additional peer group support. The rst pattern to notice is that
overall, the peer group support does not seem to be driving the results. For three of
the ve coecients, the eect is not stronger for those with the additional peer group
support. The statistical power is generally reduced when just looking at the subgroups,
but the impact on two of the key variables, i.e. the reduction in categories of debt
and in consumption cutbacks, remain statistically signicant when looking just at those
who did not receive the additional peer group support. The eect on the self-assessed
recent economic diculty is no longer statistically signicant but actually somewhat larger
among those with just the basic account without the peer group treatment. The reduction
in the amount of short-term borrowing is larger for those in the peer group treatment,
but this dierence is also not statistically signicant.
The one outcome for which there is a signicantly stronger eect for those with the
added deposit commitment device is the reduction in anxiety about the nancial future.
Intuitively, it makes sense that those who have accumulated a higher buer stock of savings
in the account would have the most improvement in this forward-looking measure.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of access to a free, liquid savings account for a low-
income population in Chile. When given access to the saving accounts, participants
substitute short-term informal credit with formal savings. They have less outstanding
debt and owe money to fewer categories of creditors. This behavior reveals that even
though in principle, participants could save at home or store money in their micro-business
25or in easily liqueable assets, these forms of savings are not equivalent to savings in the
formal savings account, and are in fact quite costly.
If savings and credit are substitute mechanisms for consumption smoothing, the ques-
tion arises whether reducing barriers to saving through a free savings account mainly leads
to a replacement of credit by savings, or whether overall smoothing is increased in addi-
tion. Looking at consumption smoothing as well as two self-reported welfare measures, we
nd that the overall level of self-insurance increases substantially. For all three measures,
the eect corresponds in magnitude to about half or more of the change in that measure
associated with a job loss or severe income shock. Finally, the savings behavior interacts
with the social environment: take-up is particularly high for those who are more socially
taxed by demands from their network, and in turn those who originally regretted not
having saved more reduce their lending to others.
These results have a number of implications for research and policy. First, as dis-
cussed in the introduction, they add to the growing evidence on the benets of facilitating
savings on a variety of outcomes. These positive ndings suggest that increasing access to
savings vehicles may be an eective way of improving the welfare of the poor. However,
private banks often do not nd it in their interest to host savings accounts for low amounts
and charge such accounts with administrative hurdles, minimum balance requirements,
and maintenance fees, which can result in large negative interest rates. Given this lack of
private incentives, governments may have a role to play in facilitating access. Reducing
access costs would make formal savings more accessible to the poor. At the same time,
our survey results also suggest that reducing mental barriers and fear of entering a bank,
or generating trust by providing endorsement by a credible institution, may play an im-
portant role in encouraging take-up, consistent with the ndings of Cole et al. (2013b)
for the case of micro-insurance.27 In designing these policies, more research is required
to study which contexts best allow for the dierent benets of savings to be realized, for
example, with respect to the optimal level of liquidity, or for settings within or outside of
micronance organizations.28
27Free basic current accounts, for example, such as very recently introduced by the Chilean government,
may play an important role in providing access to savings. Similarly, policies that facilitate deposits into
savings accounts, such as dispensing welfare payments into government-provided savings accounts rather
than paying them out in cash, as currently considered by several countries, also have potentially large
benets. On the other hand, based on the companion paper of this study (Kast et al., 2013), which shows
little response to a large increase in the interest rate, subsidies to the returns may be a less eective tool
for encouraging savings.
28Micronance clients might be dierent from others in many regards, such as nancial literacy, en-
26Second, while many studies have found that withdrawal commitment devices, which
limit the liquidity of the accounts, can help people build their savings, this illiquidity may
come at a cost, as it reduces the usefulness of the savings for precautionary purposes by
impeding discretionary use in times of need.29 This suggests that depending on the goal
a particular savings vehicle is meant to serve, and depending on the savings constraints,
dierent levels of liquidity may be optimal. It is noteworthy that a liquid savings account
with no withdrawal restrictions is not necessarily at odds with facilitating longer-term
investments, e.g. for health and education, as found by (Prina, 2013) in Nepal. It may
be important in this regard to distinguish liquidity (in terms of a lack of withdrawal
restrictions) from ease and speed of access (e.g. through a debit card or mobile phone
banking). Too much accessibility may reduce the benets of formal savings accounts
away from the home.30 An eective setup for precautionary savings might therefore be
characterized by a liquid account without withdrawal limits, but with some degree of
friction in the withdrawal process. More research is required to analyze this tradeo of
liquidity for commitment devices available for this need.
Third, the nding that those who initially regretted not having saved more are less
likely to provide credit to others in their social network after receiving access to the account
raises some questions about the overall social impact. However, these ndings have to be
interpreted with caution, since we did not start the analysis with this subgroup in mind,
and it will be important to test their replicability. If these results hold, the overall social
impact is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, access to savings vehicles increases the
peace of mind of those who can use them. In addition, if it lowers the pressure to share
money with others, this may reduce the disincentive eect of such a `social tax' (e.g., Alger
and Weibull, 2010; Jakiela and Ozier, 2012). On the other hand, the reduced lending may
diminish the welfare of others in participants' social network. Further research is required
to investigate these general equilibrium and distributional eects.
Finally, our results show that precautionary savings can, to some degree, provide
an alternative mechanism to formal insurance. This may be particularly important in
trepreneurial spirit, having signicant debt at the same time, or being more experienced with nancial
institutions.
29In contrast, deposit commitment devices such as in e.g. Madrian and Shea (2001); Thaler and Benartzi
(2004); Ashraf et al. (2006a) and Kast et al. (2013) encourage the deposit margin without necessarily
restricting withdrawals.
30Too much ease of access may not only exacerbate self-control problems (e.g. in the form of impulse-
spending), but also other-control problems, as it can make it easier for others to pressure the saver to
disclose and share the savings (Schaner, 2013).
27environments in which access to formal insurance options is limited. While insurance
contracts could in principle often provide protection from economic shocks at a lower cost
than self-insurance through savings, one benet of self-insurance is that it does not suer
from the two-sided asymmetric information problem that formal insurance products can
be faced with. In low-income environments, it is often not only dicult for the insurer
to verify the validity of insurance claims, but also for the insurance clients to trust that
the insurers will keep their future obligations. This is one of the reasons why providing
insurance to low-income populations in developing countries faces many challenges, even
for risks that seem to present relatively few problems of moral hazard or adverse selection,
such as weather risks (e.g., Gin e and Yang, 2009; Cai et al., 2012; Gin e et al., 2012; Cole et
al., 2013b). In addition, even for situations in which micro-insurance has been successfully
provided, there is no clear evidence yet on whether micro-insurance helps participants
smooth consumption.31 While for low-probability, high-loss events, self-insurance through
savings would be very costly and often not realistic, it may provide an eective alternative
for smaller loss, higher probability events such as short-term income shocks.
31Several studies do, however, nd that weather insurance can help farmers make riskier decisions (e.g.,
Vargas Hill and Viceisza, 2010; Cai, 2012; Karlan et al., 2012; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012; Cole et
al., 2013a).
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33Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance of Randomization
Full Sample Excluding Attritors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Dierence: Control Dierence:
means treatment - control means treatment - control
Age 43.29 0.10 43.44 0.12
(11.61) (0.44) (11.55) (0.47)
Years of education 9.81 -0.16 9.76 -0.13
(3.12) (0.16) (3.08) (0.16)
Household size 4.27 0.06 4.30 0.05
(1.73) (0.07) (1.69) (0.07)
Per capita monthly 79,955 564 79,419 965
household income (64,495) (2,492) (65,695) (2,622)
[66,000] [1,500] [65,429] [1,571]
Has prior savings account 0.32 0.01 0.32 0.01
(0.47) (0.02) (0.47) (0.02)
Prior formal savings amount 63,260 5,720 60,408 2,984
(241,301) (8,541) (225,865) (8,335)
[0] [0] [0] [0]
Short-term borrowing amount 165,957 -61,059 171,272 -65,063
(1,642,180) (44,801) (1,741,846) (50,762)
[0] [0] [0] [0]
Short-term borrowing amount 65,616 -3,613 66,692 -4,699
(winsorized at 95%) (130,687) (5,085) (131,801) (5,162)
Short-term borrowing 0.91 0.03 0.91 0.05
categories (1.13) (0.05) (1.12) (0.05)
Short-term lending amount 110,118 28,101 114,074 30,936
(621,082) (27,169) (660,584) (31,464)
[13,000] [2,000] [15,000] [0]
Short-term lending amount 68,763 6,256 68,052 6,963
(winsorized at 95%) (113,236) (4,451) (111,995) (4,732)
Short-term lending categories 1.07 0.06 1.08 0.05
(1.20) (0.05) (1.19) (0.05)
Need to cut back consumption 0.70 0.01 0.70 0.01
(0.46) (0.02) (0.46) (0.02)
Anxious about nancial future 2.90 0.04 2.91 0.04
(0.97) (0.04) (0.97) (0.05)
Recent economic diculty 5.03 0.14 5.00 0.18
(2.79) (0.12) (2.78) (0.13)
Number of individuals in 1,488 2,687 1,304 2,279
control and treatment group
Notes: Columns (1) and (3) show the control group mean for the full sample and the sample excluding the attritors
respectively, with the standard deviation in parenthesis. Columns (2) and (4) show the coecients of regressions
of the pre-treatment variable in question on a treatment dummy, with robust standard errors, clustered at the
group level, in parenthesis. Medians are displayed in brackets, and all nancial gures are in Chilean pesos. 500
Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. The variables \anxious about nancial future" and \recent economic diculty"
range from 1 to 4 and 1 to 10 respectively. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
34Table 2: Descriptive Statistics On Take-Up and Account Usage
Panel A: Take-Up Statistics
Number of Total Percent of
individuals sample sample
Opened account 1,218 2,279 53%
Active user 886 2,279 39%
Panel B: Account Usage Conditional on Being an Active User
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Number of deposits 4.4 2 5.4
Amount deposited 66,898 9,000 215,523
Number of withdrawals 1.0 0 1.8
Amount withdrawn 46,664 0 148,549
Average end of month balance 18,456 5,000 77,672
Number of observations 886 886 886
Notes: This sample is restricted to participants who are included in the follow up survey. Active user is
dened as a participant who used the account beyond the minimum opening deposit. All nancial gures
are in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD.
35Table 3: Eects on Short-Term Borrowing
Components of Short-Term Borrowing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Owed to Owed to Owed to
short-term family and service business
borrowing friends providers contacts and
institutions
Panel A: Amounts (Winsorized at 95th Percentile)
Account x post -12,931** -6,480*** 428 -1,689
(5,867) (2,465) (1,363) (1,694)
Post 226 2,523 -1,010 -2,655*
(5,006) (2,279) (1,141) (1,401)
Constant 61,112*** 13,622*** 12,056*** 13,773***
(1,333) (510) (316) (396)
Control group mean 64,357 17,053 10,985 11,380
Panel B: Categories of Short-Term Borrowing
Account x post -0.127** -0.072** -0.057** 0.001
(0.052) (0.029) (0.027) (0.021)
Post -0.341*** -0.106*** -0.102*** -0.133***
(0.043) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018)
Constant 0.936*** 0.304*** 0.372*** 0.261***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Control group mean 0.571 0.199 0.235 0.137
Individual xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 3,572 3,572 3,572 3,572
Observations 7,144 7,144 7,144 7,144
Notes: For a description of the categories included in each component of short-term
borrowing, see Section 2.3. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level, re-
ported in parenthesis. Level of signicance: All nancial gures are in Chilean pesos.
500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
36Table 4: Eects on Lending
Full Sample Always or Frequently Regret
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Lent to Lent to Total Lent to Lent to
lending family and business lending family and business
friends contacts friends contacts
Panel A: Amounts (Winsorized at 95th Percentile)
Account x post -3,154 -5,620 2,707 -11,852* -11,783*** 1,747
(5,671) (3,491) (2,524) (6,495) (4,093) (3,006)
Post 8,757** -1,241 3,168* 13,309*** 2,390 2,561
(4,368) (2,778) (1,844) (5,062) (3,235) (2,341)
Constant 74,896*** 35,739*** 30,910*** 76,386*** 37,841*** 31,086***
(1,401) (842) (642) (1,595) (992) (736)
Control group mean 79,543 31,599 34,763 83,099 34,129 35,657
Panel B: Categories of Borrowers
Account x post -0.078 -0.047 -0.031 -0.159*** -0.102** -0.056*
(0.052) (0.037) (0.027) (0.058) (0.041) (0.032)
Post -0.324*** -0.230*** -0.093*** -0.290*** -0.214*** -0.076***
(0.042) (0.030) (0.021) (0.045) (0.031) (0.024)
Constant 1.110*** 0.564*** 0.546*** 1.145*** 0.593*** 0.552***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008)
Control group mean 0.759 0.321 0.438 0.804 0.344 0.460
Individual xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 3,566 3,566 3,566 2,438 2,438 2,438
Observations 7,132 7,132 7,132 4,876 4,876 4,876
Notes: Participants were asked if they regretted not having saved more in the preceding three months.
Columns (4)-(6) contain the sample of participants who indicated that they `always' or `frequently' regretted
not having saved more. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level, reported in parenthesis. All
nancial gures are in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
37Table 5: Consumption Variation in the Face of Economic Shocks
Individual Treatment Eects AES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Meals Meat Medicines School Clothing School Public Eating Consumption
supplies snacks transport out variation
(Cols 1-8)
Account x post -0.014 -0.083** -0.019 -0.036 -0.057 -0.040* -0.101** -0.029 Coecient:
(0.026) (0.039) (0.035) (0.026) (0.043) (0.021) (0.040) (0.043) -0.112**
Post 0.035 0.117*** -0.019 -0.052*** 0.096*** 0.033** 0.159*** 0.044 Robust SE:
(0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.019) (0.035) (0.016) (0.033) (0.036) 0.055
Constant 0.118*** 0.440*** 0.300*** 0.215*** 0.546*** 0.093*** 0.341*** 0.426*** P-value:
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 0.042
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
xed eects
Individuals 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435 1,435
Observations 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870 2,870
R-squared 0.005 0.015 0.004 0.027 0.011 0.003 0.030 0.002
Control group mean 0.146 0.530 0.274 0.144 0.609 0.109 0.472 0.446
in post period
Notes: Participants were asked whether they had to cut back their consumption of the particular item due to economic diculties in the preceding
three months. The consumption item variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the answer is yes. Robust standard errors, clustered at
the group level, reported in parenthesis. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
3
8Table 6: Self-Reported Economic Well-Being
Individual Treatment Eects Average Eect Size (AES)
Anxiety about Recent economic Subjective
nancial future diculty economic well-being
Account x post -0.112* -0.087* Coecient:
(0.059) (0.051) -0.102**
Post -0.106** 0.154*** Robust SE:
(0.051) (0.041) 0.046
Constant 0.000 0.000 P-value:
(0.013) (0.012) 0.027




Notes: Both \anxiety about nancial future" and \recent economic diculty" are expressed in standard
deviations. Individuals are excluded in case of non-response to a particular question, which explains
the dierences in the number of observations. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level,
reported in parenthesis. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
39Table 7: Take-up of the Account
Panel A: Demographics
(1)
Panel B: Other Characteristics
(2) (3)
Take-up Take-up Take-up
Female 0.079** Head of household -0.032 -0.032
(0.039) (0.022) (0.022)
Age 0.027*** Conict with partner over money 0.052** 0.052**
(0.005) (0.024) (0.024)
Age squared -0.0002*** Socially taxed 0.063**
(0.0001) (0.024)
Years of education 0.005 Lent to family or friends 0.047**
(0.004) (0.024)
Children at home -0.013 Owes to family or friends -0.030
(0.009) (0.025)
Log income 0.005 Regret not saving more 0.006 0.006
(0.019) (0.011) (0.011)
Has prior savings account 0.038* Hyperbolic preferences 0.052** 0.052**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Fear savings stolen in the home 0.007 0.006
(0.034) (0.034)
Constant -0.473* Constant -0.483* -0.475*
(0.281) (0.280) (0.282)
Demographics from panel A Yes Yes
Individuals 2,149 Individuals 2,052 2,052
R-squared 0.029 R-squared 0.041 0.040
Mean take-up 0.389 Mean take-up 0.393 0.393
Notes: Linear probability regressions among individuals who were oered an account and were present
in both surveys, regressing baseline characteristics on take-up. Take-up is dened as actively using the
account beyond the minimum opening deposit. The regressions in Panel B include the demographic
controls from Panel A. \Children at home" is the total number of individuals aged 18 years or younger
living at home. The variable \socially taxed" is a dummy indicating that an individual has lent to family
and friends and does not owe to family or friends. Individuals are excluded in case of non-response to a
particular question, which explains the lower number of observations in Panel B. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the group level, reported in parenthesis. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
4
0Table 8: Demand Eects
(1) (2)
Diculty of Satisfaction







Notes: Participants were asked to rate how compli-
cated they found the survey process (scale of 1 to 4)
and how satised they were with Fondo Esperanza
(scale of 1 to 7). Individuals are excluded in case of
non-response to a particular question, which explains
the dierences in the number of observations. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the group level, reported
in parenthesis. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
41Table 9: Dierential Eects by Type of Account
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Short-term Short-term Anxiety Recent Consumption
borrowing borrowing about economic cutback
amount categories nancial diculty categories
future
Any account x post -9,774 -0.139** -0.044 -0.095 -0.457**
(6,975) (0.063) (0.068) (0.061) (0.215)
Additional peer group treatment x post -5,831 0.022 -0.126** 0.015 0.146
(6,206) (0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.202)
Constant 61,111*** 0.936*** 0.000 0.000 2.479***
(1,331) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.043)
R-squared 0.005 0.111 0.023 0.008 0.011
Individual xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 3,572 3,572 3,519 3,515 1,435
Observations 7,144 7,144 7,038 7,030 2,870
Notes: Regressions for the key results from Tables 3, 6 and 5. The rst row shows treatment eects for those with
just the savings account, the second row shows the dierence of the eects for those with the additional peer group
support. The outcome variable in Column (5) is the total number of categories of spending a participant had to cut
back on and the sample is the same as in Table 5. Individuals are excluded in case of non-response to a particular
question, which explains the dierences in the number of observations. Robust standard errors, clustered at the
group level, in parenthesis. All nancial gures are in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. Level of
signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4
2A Appendix
Table A1: Eects on Short-Term Borrowing:
Non-Winsorized and Winsorized at the 99th Percentile
Components of Short-Term Borrowing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Owed to Owed to Owed to
short-term family and service business
borrowing friends providers contacts and
institutions
Panel A: Non-Winsorized Amounts
Account x post 44,151 -3,116 42,518 4,749
(50,172) (13,479) (37,894) (13,417)
Post -73,086 -6,108 -43,515 -23,463**
(49,067) (12,450) (37,665) (11,133)
Constant 129,840*** 37,943*** 39,645*** 52,251***
(9,504) (2,794) (6,960) (3,123)
Control group mean 98,299 43,358 21,271 33,670
Panel B: Amounts Winsorized at 99th Percentile
Account x post -9,846 -12,129* 2,000 -2,494
(11,193) (6,460) (2,761) (5,491)
Post -9,982 7,387 -2,929 -8,689*
(9,529) (6,019) (2,280) (4,620)
Constant 90,784*** 25,185*** 18,844*** 33,087***
(2,547) (1,323) (646) (1,263)
Control group mean 89,375 36,665 16,733 25,673
Individual xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 3,572 3,572 3,572 3,572
Observations 7,144 7,144 7,144 7,144
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level, reported in parenthesis.
For categories included in each component of short-term borrowing, see Section 2.3.
All nancial gures are in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. Level of
signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
43Table A2: Eects on Lending:
Non-Winsorized and Winsorized at the 99th Percentile
Full Sample Always or Frequently Regret
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Lent to Lent to Total Lent to Lent to
lending family and business lending family and business
friends contacts friends contacts
Panel A: Non-winsorized Amounts
Account x post -16,744 -15,243 -1,501 -22,676 -35,512 12,836
(31,272) (24,408) (18,836) (41,193) (34,777) (19,753)
Post -873 -846 -27 8,332 13,644 -5,312
(17,532) (10,922) (13,120) (25,177) (14,807) (19,051)
Constant 133,705*** 73,474*** 60,231*** 133,858*** 81,480*** 52,378***
(8,833) (7,221) (4,917) (11,400) (10,448) (3,797)
Control group mean 115,477 56,401 59,076 129,630 66,675 62,954
Panel B: Amounts Winsorized at 99th Percentile
Account x post -58 -4,203 4,080 -18,804* -15,774** 1,195
(9,766) (6,497) (4,521) (11,123) (7,988) (5,108)
Post 10,675 -1,423 8,421** 23,458*** 8,472 7,624*
(7,707) (5,075) (3,362) (8,775) (6,255) (3,890)
Constant 96,449*** 52,107*** 39,331*** 97,055*** 54,242*** 39,380***
(2,371) (1,587) (1,139) (2,704) (1,949) (1,271)
Control group mean 101,133 45,143 48,396 108,888 51,071 49,157
Individual xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individuals 3,566 3,566 3,566 2,438 2,438 2,438
Observations 7,132 7,132 7,132 4,876 4,876 4,876
Notes: Participants were asked if they regretted not having saved more in the preceding three months.
Columns (4)-(6) contain the sample of participants who indicated that they `always' or `frequently' regretted
not having saved more. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level, reported in parenthesis. All
nancial gures are in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
44Table A3: Consumption Variation (Entire Sample)
Individual Treatment Eects AES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Meals Meat Medicines School Clothing School Public Eating Consumption
supplies snacks transport out variation
(Cols 1 { 8)
Account x post -0.013 -0.047* -0.024 -0.008 0.006 -0.004 -0.050* -0.021 Coecient:
(0.016) (0.027) (0.022) (0.018) (0.032) (0.013) (0.028) (0.030) -0.046
Post 0.005 0.022 -0.039** -0.092*** -0.029 -0.008 0.061** -0.022 Robust SE:
(0.013) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.027) (0.010) (0.023) (0.026) 0.038
Constant 0.107*** 0.408*** 0.263*** 0.202*** 0.513*** 0.085*** 0.317*** 0.416*** P-value:
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 0.229
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
xed eects
Individuals 3,583 3,583 3,583 3,583 3,583 3,583 3,583 3,583
Observations 7,166 7,166 7,166 7,166 7,166 7,166 7,166 7,166
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.043 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003
Control group mean 0.109 0.409 0.212 0.107 0.482 0.072 0.365 0.380
in post period
Notes: Participants were asked whether they had to cut back their consumption of the particular item due to economic diculties in the preceding
three months. The consumption item variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the answer is yes. Robust standard errors, clustered at
the group level, reported in parenthesis. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
4
5Generalized Ordered Probit
Table A4: Anxiety about the Financial Future
(1) (2) (3)
Anxiety > 1 Anxiety > 2 Anxiety > 3
Account x post -0.067 -0.093 -0.177**
(0.106) (0.077) (0.080)
Account 0.040 -0.007 0.084
(0.068) (0.062) (0.057)
Post 0.062 -0.224*** -0.100
(0.088) (0.067) (0.064)
Constant 1.191*** 0.576*** -0.496***
(0.053) (0.052) 0.044
Observations 7,038 7,038 7,038
Notes: The dependent variable in each Column is \anxiety about nancial
future" taking a value of 0 or 1, depending on the threshold in question. In
Column (1), \anxiety" takes a value of 1 if anxiety is rated above `1' and zero
otherwise. In Column (2), \anxiety" takes a value of 1 if it is rated above
`2' and zero otherwise, etc. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group
level, reported in parenthesis. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
4
6Table A5: Recent Economic Diculty
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic Economic Economic Economic
diculty > 2 diculty > 4 diculty > 6 diculty > 8
Account x post -0.079 -0.150** -0.077 -0.052
(0.078) (0.069) (0.071) (0.077)
Account 0.077 0.088 0.074 0.072
(0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.062)
Post 0.358*** 0.262*** 0.082 -0.015
(0.061) (0.053) (0.060) (0.058)
Constant 0.752*** 0.218*** -0.578*** -1.121***
(0.046) (0.044) 0.046 (0.049)
Observations 7,030 7,030 7,030 7,030
Notes: The dependent variable \recent economic diculty" ranges from 1 to 10. For
this regression it has been aggregated into bins of two. In Column (1), \past economic
diculty" takes a value of 1 if past economic diculty is rated above `2' and zero
otherwise. In Column (2), \past economic diculty" takes a value of 1 if it is rated
above `4' and zero otherwise, etc. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level,
reported in parenthesis. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4
7Attrition
Table A6: Balance of Attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control Dierence: Non-attritors Dierence:





Years of education 9.68 0.21
(3.08) (0.14)
Household size 4.33 -0.16**
(1.73) (0.08)
Per capita monthly household 80,034 2,025
income (62,091) (2,492)
Has prior savings account 0.33 -0.00
(0.47) (0.02)
Prior formal savings amount 62,306 32,687*
(232,150) (18,416)
Short-term borrowing amount 129,852 -22,767
(1,111,991) (25,813)
Short-term borrowing amount 63,701 -2,910
winsorized at 95% (129,018) (5,862)
Short-term borrowing categories 0.94 -0.06
(1.16) (0.05)
Short-term lending amount 133,747 -39,117**
(1,047,081) (19,440)
Short-term lending amount 72,480 2,170
winsorized at 95% (120,306) (5,296)
Short-term lending categories 1.11 -0.01
(1.22) (0.05)
Need to cut back consumption 0.71 -0.02
(0.45) (0.02)
Anxious about nancial future 2.93 -0.05
(0.97) (0.05)
Recent economic diculty 5.12 0.02
(2.77) (0.12)
Individuals 1,488 2,687 3,583 592
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show the regression of attrition on the treatment dummy and a constant term for the full
sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the coecients from the regressions of the pre-treatment variable in question on
the attrition dummy and a constant term. Columns (1) and (3) report standard deviation in the parenthesis, whereas
Columns (2) and (4) report standard errors from the respective regression in parenthesis. The variables \anxious about
nancial future" and \recent economic diculty" range from 1 to 4 and 1 to 10 respectively. All nancial gures in
Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
48Table A7: Lee Bounds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Short-term Short-term Anxiety Recent
borrowing borrowing about economic
amount categories nancial diculty
future
Point estimate -12,931** 0.127** -0.112* -0.087*
Lower bound [-13,839, [ -0.138, [-0.170, [-0.123,
Upper bound -3,140 ] -0.076] -0.080] -0.056]
Individuals after trimming 3,572 3,572 3,478 3,475
Observations after trimming 7,144 7,144 6,956 6,950
Notes: Lee bounds for the main results from Tables 3 and 6, calculated using the
methodology discussed in Section 3.3. Rows 2 and 3 show the Lee bounds. The
bounds cannot be calculated for the improvements in consumption smoothing in case
of economic shocks (Table 5), since by construction, we do not know, which attritors
had shocks. The rst row shows the point estimates from the original regression. All
nancial gures are in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos = about 1 USD. Level of
signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4
9Table A8: Inverse Probability Weighting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Total Anxiety Recent Consumption
short-term short-term about economic cutback
borrowing borrowing nancial diculty categories
amount categories future
Account x post -13,930** -0.127** -0.117* -0.096* -0.396**
(5,847) (0.051) (0.060) (0.051) (0.188)
Post 576 -0.334*** -0.097* 0.157*** 0.417***
(4,977) (0.042) (0.051) (0.041) (0.157)
Constant 60,939*** 0.927*** -0.008 0.002 2.483***
(1,339) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.043)
Individual
xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.006 0.109 0.021 0.008 0.011
Individuals 3,572 3,572 3,519 3,515 1,435
Observations 7,144 7,144 7,038 7,030 2,870
Notes: Regressions for the key results from Tables 3, 6 and 5, weighted using the inverse
probability weights described in Section 3.3. The outcome variable in Column (5) is the
total number of categories of spending a participant had to cut back on and the sample
is the same as in Table 5. All nancial gures are in Chilean pesos. 500 Chilean pesos
= about 1 USD. Robust standard errors, clustered at the group level, in parentheses.
Level of signicance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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0